Joaquin Flores
Projecting what Trump is likely to do is difficult, after all he is strategically posturing in a way that suggests several mutually exclusive outcomes.
Whether or not the U.S. will launch strikes on Venezuela, pursue regime change, continue strikes on drug-smuggling boats, or land on some compromise with Venezuelan President Maduro, quite deservedly has the full attention of millions cognizant of the disastrous outcomes major escalation would create. In recent pieces in the New York Times and Al Jazeera the ins and outs of where U.S. President Trump may land delivered to readers a grim picture pointing at major action and warning of triggering instability. At the same time, the Financial Times published a piece calling on Trump to strike a deal and avoid any military entanglement, laying out that easing of sanctions and striking a deal with Maduro was most realistic. Nevertheless, regime change keeps coming up as an option, but there has been a startling lack of official U.S. interaction with the Venezuelan opposition figurehead, Maria Corina Machado, who otherwise would be expected to head-up precisely the kind of transitional government required if pursuing that end.
As we develop upon what we detailed in " Is the U.S. Caribbean buildup part of Israel's strategy to derail Gaza peace ? Of oil, Machado, and Venezuelan regime change", the main force behind Venezuelan opposition leader Machado as head of a future government of Venezuela is Netanyahu, with Trump meanwhile remaining positioned strategically without a commitment. It sure looks like Trump could try to topple Maduro, but the U.S. already has whatever deal it wants from the Venezuelan government, and they can continue to tariff any other country that deals with them. Not a bad situation to be in if you are the U.S.
And besides, Trump doesn't have domestic support to attack Venezuela as it's been a polarizing question among his electorate, a considerable number of them who condition their support on his commitment not to start wars. A recent CBS-YouGov poll suggests 70% of Americans do not support a military approach to Venezuela, and confronted with headlines in Reuters like " Just 29% of Americans support U.S. military killing drug suspects, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds", whether it will influence Trump's thinking remains to be seen. It easily could, these figures include in them a sizable piece of Trump's potential voters in mid-term elections in less than a year. Trump also took a considerable toll on his credibility in his association with Netanyahu, and behind this are that a large part of his foreign policy and considerable parts of his domestic base align on supporting Gaza reconstruction. Against this, Netanyahu would like some leverage and the ability to restart the conflict even if several oil transit countries or suppliers flinch, and Venezuela provides Netanyahu several solutions.
Netanyahu vs. Trump and MbS
Trump's fragile peace in Gaza depends on Netanyahu having fewer core economic options other than peace, and access to Venezuela's oil through Machado now would give Netanyahu more leverage to support his bellicosity against this peace.
Trump has struggled against Netanyahu, ultimately forcing him to a multi-staged withdrawal from Gaza, as we detailed previously in ' Trump's ultimatum on Gaza: a policy coup against Netanyahu'. Trump appears to have aligned more closely with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman than with Netanyahu, with the White House reporting curiously that based on the mid-November meeting and agreement, the de facto Saudi leader would be investing $600 billion in to the U.S. However, Al Jazeera reporting on the same event included;
"In recent months, Trump has repeatedly said he would like Saudi Arabia to join the so-called Abraham Accords, which established formal relations between Israel and several Arab countries.
On Tuesday, Prince Mohammed and Trump signalled possible progress on the issue without providing details or a timeline for a potential deal. The crown prince, however, did reiterate that Riyadh wants to advance the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of a potential agreement."
The Saudi position stands opposed to Israel's, which limits Netanyahu's negotiating position. But his hands are freer to restart IDF aggression in Gaza and beyond if he can count on a Machado in Venezuela. Israel faces a basic energy problem, with several internal reports, later cited, urging it to diversify its oil supply to achieve its daily requirement of roughly 240,000 barrels. Saudi Arabia will most probably not work with Israel on Eli Cohen's project to bring Saudi oil in to Israel and beyond if Israel starts up again in Gaza.
On the other hand, Israel is primed to make use of existing European infrastructure to refine Venezuelan Merey crude. Merey is simply a heavy, sour grade that several complex refineries are already designed to handle. European refineries routinely capable of processing Venezuelan heavy crude include Repsol's Cartagena and Bilbao (Petronor) refineries in Spain and Eni's Sannazzaro de' Burgondi and Gela refineries in Italy.
"I don't know who she is"
Trump sits apart from Netanyahu on almost every Palestinian, Qatari, Saudi, and even Iran related question. When asked about the Venezuelan opposition leader winning the Nobel Prize a few days later, he responded that she "seems like a very nice lady" but added, " I don't know who she is." He couldn't have been thrilled that Machado received the Nobel for breathing and had his own eye on the prize. Machado called Trump after winning, not the other way around, which is odd enough on its own.
Trump had been talking openly for months about wanting the Nobel Prize. By highlighting a prize he couldn't win but felt he deserved, he placed himself in conflict with the chosen winner who did nothing to earn it. The prize was obviously handed to Machado to engineer pressure on Venezuela and corner Trump diplomatically.
Netanyahu's prompt call to Machado after the Nobel announcement felt uncannily familiar when recalling late 2020, when the Netanyahu aligned and Murdoch owned Fox News rushed to declare Biden the winner of the U.S. presidential election. This while the vote was still being counted and would remain forever contested by Trump, a gesture Trump later described to Axios as a personal betrayal, saying flatly, "F*ck him."
Beyond rhetoric and more significantly, Machado's party organization, 'Vente Venezuela', signed a cooperation deal with Likud covering political, ideological, security, and energy matters. In this, Machado openly recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital and says she will move Venezuela's embassy there, while supporting Netanyahu's government and praising its Gaza and Iran policies. This alignment matters because it positions Machado as a reliable partner for Netanyahu.
In looking at how Israel has built its economic relationship with Brazil over the years, we also understand that any opening up of Venezuela would see the same firms ready to exploit privatization and preferential access to the countless number of Israeli firms already operating in Latin America. More to the point than giving Israel leverage in energy and security matters, it creates the geopolitical opening that makes a Venezuela regime change a tool for Israel to strengthen its hand against other oil import constraints, and the Gaza ceasefire which Netanyahu would like some leverage against. It's this that really establishes Machado as Netanyahu's candidate for Venezuela, and spells out Netanyahu's plan.
Netanyahu under pressure
Netanyahu is deeply displeased with the outcome of Israel's campaign in Gaza and desperately seeks a plausible opening to renegotiate the current terms. In the end, he was effectively forced by Trump, other countries, and internal factions within Israel, including the Israeli CIS organization of former Mossad and Shin Bet chiefs, to endorse Trump's 20-Point Peace Agreement, which became UN Security Council Resolution 2803 on November 17th.
Sovereignty over Gaza, the ethnic cleansing of its native population, and the re-opening of the territory for Israeli settler-colonists removed by Ariel Sharon in 2005 are now off the table. Ever since most of the world reacted negatively to Israel's grotesque and disproportionate response to the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, including nations Israel relies on economically, the Netanyahu government framed the situation to Israelis as a war economy with citizens being told they faced isolation.
In reality, global pressures from movements within many countries as much as governments themselves have already put pressure on Israel, and that pressure would only grow if Israel provokes renewed fighting in Gaza. At the core of all of it is energy. Israel imports most of its oil from a small handful of countries. Turkey (due to its being a transit hub for Azeri and Kazakh oil) and Brazil are critical in the events at play, as is Russia, and Israel's violation of what is now a UN resolution would increase that pressure from supplying and transiting countries, working against Israel's strategic energy diversification imperative.
Israel Lacks Oil Import Diversity - The Gaza Invasion Created Huge Problems
Netanyahu has struggled to maintain Israel's energy security under real external pressure. Israel openly acknowledges that its oil system depends almost entirely on imports. According to its own Ministry of Energy in this report Israeli government report from 2021, there are no commercial oil wells in Israel, and all crude is imported, making the country deeply exposed to supply risk. Meanwhile, the Middle East Institute of Japan research highlights that in 2023 Israel was 96 percent dependent on foreign crude, a strategic vulnerability in a volatile global environment. (See " The Gaza Crisis and Israel's Energy Security," MEIJ). Analysts at Israel's INSS also warn that this over-reliance on a narrow set of suppliers (like Azerbaijan) and specific shipping routes is a serious national-security weakness that must be addressed. (See INSS paper " We Need a New Concept for the Security of Electrical Systems").
In Brazil Labor unions, humanitarian, and pro-Palestine groups in Brazil helped halt oil shipments to Israel in 2025. That oil was rerouted via Italy, but the disruption was serious in terms of PR, and a sign of things to come should those oil industry unions place even more pressure on Lula to stop the Italian re-rerouting scheme. Brazil's National Federation of Oil Workers (FNP) has been clear about the potential repercussions, moves towards a general strike, and a revelation that "In 2025, through our research we have found that Brazil keeps providing fuel to Israel, now through a refinery in Italy, Saras in Sardinia."
Turkey exerted pressure on Azerbaijan over oil shipments to Israel, signaling that continued flows through Turkish territory could provoke political backlash. Some shipments were threatened with being halted or rerouted, creating real risk for Israel's energy supply. Turkish public protests have grown, especially over Azeri oil transiting through Turkey's Ceyhan terminal to Israel. Turkey officially insists contrary to protesters that no Azeri oil has been shipped to Israel, with the Energy Ministry calling the protesters claims baseless in its public denial. Turkish outlets repeat the same line, saying Ankara's trade cutoff has been respected, as reported by Turkish Minute. Yet analysts at Israel's INSS note that protests in Turkey erupted because many believed the shipments were still occurring, even under the embargo. The basic conclusion is that Turkey publicly says the oil flow has stopped, while activists and researchers argue the opposite and point to evidence of quiet continuation. As for alternatives, Azerbaijan cannot meaningfully supply Israel without Turkey because the BTC line to Ceyhan is the only practical export route that connects Azeri crude to the Mediterranean. Whatever comes to light in Turkey, the political climate points towards the real likelihood of shipments being tightened at any rate should a greater reason against Netanyahu emerge.
Kazakh crude destined for Israel travels through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to Russia's Black Sea terminal, where it is loaded onto tankers for export. According to Oil Change International analysis reported by media, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan together supplied roughly 70 percent of Israel's imported crude between November 2023 and October 2025, significantly more than the figures shown in our chart in figure 1, above, from a different source. On April 1, 2025, though not citing anything other than technical difficulties, Russia ordered two of the three offshore moorings at the CPC Black Sea terminal to be shut down after snap inspections by its transport watchdog, reducing CPC's loading capacity by about 50 percent.
These moves created a real operational choke point which verifies Israel's needs to diversify its oil sources as a security matter. Despite this, Israeli petrol and diesel prices remained relatively steady.
Good-bye Mediterranean: Redeploying the U.S. Navy for Diplomacy?
The naval deployments tell their own story, though interpretation remains contested. The concentration of American naval assets in Puerto Rico, including vessels like the USS Gravely that previously protected Israeli interests in the Persian Gulf, creates an interesting dual possibility. Some might read this as preparation for Venezuelan intervention. Yet these same deployments necessarily reduce naval coverage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, potentially constraining Israeli military options vis-à-vis Iran, Lebanon, even Syria. Could this be strategic ambiguity at work, where different actors see what they need to see?
The most effective strategies often work by appearing to serve one purpose while actually advancing another, a kind of geopolitical Rorschach test in which every actor sees what they want to see. The naval deployment might be positioned to crack Venezuela open for exploitation with Israel's diversification needs coming along for the ride. Or the buildup may serve some other end while strategically leaving Israel without nearby United States support if it provokes hostilities with its neighbors.
The Naval buildup is a redirection therefore as well, irrespective of intention, raising questions which are only exacerbated by Trump's notable if not also intentional contradictory public statements about Venezuela. He speaks of attacking drug cartels and warns that "Maduro's days are numbered," yet when pressed on specifics, his administration's actual policies suggest continuity rather than confrontation. The New York Times reported again on December 5th on military options being considered, citing unnamed officials discussing everything from strikes on the country to capturing even killing Maduro, and an elaborate but vague discussion of contenders for power in Caracas including of course Machado but curiously profiling Maduro's own General Lopez Padrino while leaving out Juan Guaido.
Maduro for his part has pursued personal diplomacy with Trump through widely broadcast statements. Throughout August and September 2025, before the current tensions escalated, Maduro consistently avoided blaming Trump personally for American pressure, instead attributing problems to "malactors" within Trump's administration working against both nations' interests. He even suggested publicly that he and Trump could be friends, a remarkable statement given the circumstances. What explains this asymmetric courtesy?
The long and short
Perhaps a managed crisis that satisfies domestic constituencies without fundamental change might serve both Trump and Maduro's interests. Trump is pursuing a strategic reorientation out of the Mediterranean and towards the Americas under the pretext of stopping drug trafficking and cornering authoritarian regimes, making moves that are difficult to assess by those like Netanyahu trying to drive Trump's policies; perhaps creating an opening for Israel while actually leaving them with considerable less support. Maduro can reliably rally nationalist and populist anti-Yankee sentiment against the specter of American aggression while ultimately presenting a compromise with Trump as a victory that kept the peace, which Maduro could attribute to the resolve of the Venezuelan people.
But Netanyahu's calculations differ. It remains to be seen whether Netanyahu can leverage enough power in the U.S., perhaps through AIPAC pressure on congress or a crisis designed to pull in the U.S. military, to push American policy toward actual regime change in Venezuela. Despite the certain political costs, Trump may do it. On the other hand Trump's apparent preference for theatrical confrontation without substantive escalation may yet prevail.
Which way Trump?
Projecting what Trump is likely to do is difficult, after all he is strategically posturing in a way that suggests several mutually exclusive outcomes. What is certain is that Maduro has already given clear signals to Trump that he is amenable to any deal, while rhetoric from Caracas conceals that fact. Trump could appease some neocon forces in the U.S. and Israel and go for regime change in Venezuela but this likely would require military action, costing him politically and reputationally. And none of that is necessary to pursue the interests of Chevron or later ExxonMobil in Venezuela. Or Trump may maintain the status quo, continuing to strike boats at sea, or perhaps even symbolically striking a drug processing compound inside of Venezuela of no import to Caracas, echoing Trump's past moves in Syria or Iran. Then perhaps Trump would use the success of those simulacra-laden strikes as the reason that Maduro agreed to Trump's terms, even though Maduro already had. But this present naval buildup also serves several larger geopolitical goals such as a pull-out from the Mid-East and a new focus on security in the Americas, with Maduro being merely an abstract anthropomorphized cause for all of this, so the spectacle may continue on until these larger goals are accomplished.
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