The deployment of US Navy destroyers near Venezuela reignites Cold War dynamics in the Caribbean. Trump's Monroe Doctrine 2.0 targets Caracas while signaling to China and BRICS. Hybrid warfare and gunboat diplomacy raise risks of escalation across Latin America. with Caracas mobilizing millions of militia citizens and Brazil warning of regional instability.
Tuesday, August 26, 2025
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
The deployment of three US Navy destroyers off the Venezuelan coast has raised the specter of escalation in the Caribbean, with Washington citing "anti-narcotics operations" as the official justification. Roughly 4,000 US sailors and Marines are reportedly involved, backed by surveillance aircraft and even submarines. As a matter of fact, it is the most significant naval show of force in the region in years.
Having acknowledged that, on the surface at least, the operation does appear limited in scope, however. Thus far, there is no credible evidence of preparations for a full-scale invasion or a coup d'état orchestrated from Washington. Instead, this looks like an updated version of gunboat diplomacy - in other words, it is about projecting force to intimidate Caracas while reassuring allies. One may recall that somewhat similar deployments took place in 2020 under Trump's first presidency, also under the guise of anti-cartel missions. The language of "counter-narcotics" often doubles as cover for broader strategic objectives.
Venezuela has responded accordingly. President Nicolás Maduro announced the mobilization of the country's 4.5 million-strong civilian militia, a force often derided in the Western press but designed precisely to raise the costs of any foreign intervention. Caracas is not defenseless: from Soviet-era armored vehicles to Russian-made air defense systems, the Venezuelan armed forces, to some extent, possess real deterrent capability.
The American establishment in turn remains fixated on the idea that Venezuela is a regional "threat." Trump himself has revived a Monroe Doctrine 2.0 posture, and the message seems to be clear enough, given the timing even: Europe and Ukraine are being deprioritized so that the American continent can once again be policed by Washington. No wonder analysts speak of a strategic pivot. Reports indicate that Trump seeks deeper coordination with Argentina under Javier Milei while exerting greater pressure on Colombia, thereby building an anti-Maduro arc in South America.
Brazil, for its part, is alarmed. While Lula da Silva's government has refrained from inflammatory statements, it is acutely aware that any escalation in Venezuela would destabilize the wider region.
Washington's pressure on Caracas cannot be separated from the larger New Cold War with China, whose growing presence in Venezuela is seen in Washington as a red line.
It is also no coincidence that Trump's hawkish posture also serves as a warning to the BRICS bloc, which has been debating Venezuela's possible accession, so far blocked by Brazil. A Venezuela inside BRICS would strengthen multipolar institutions and further weaken US leverage in Latin America - precisely the scenario that neoconservatives such as Marco Rubio, even with a neo-Monroe rhetoric, are determined to prevent. In this sense, the naval buildup off Venezuela is not just about regime change, but about containing multipolarity itself.
In any case, hybrid warfare is the more likely path forward. Instead of sending Marines into Caracas, Washington can tighten sanctions, foster internal unrest, and coordinate with regional allies for intelligence and logistical encirclement. So much for "fighting drug cartels": the strategic target remains regime change. This is not just speculation: The 2002 coup attempt against Hugo Chávez, openly welcomed by the Bush administration, stands as precedent. The underreported pattern shows a clear continuity of policy.
Hybrid tactics, after all, allow Washington to bleed Caracas without incurring the costs of direct confrontation. Cyber operations, psychological warfare, and the weaponization of migration flows are tools that complement sanctions and diplomatic isolation. In this regard, one should recall that US strategy in Venezuela has often resembled a slow-motion siege rather than open war. By keeping the threat of military intervention alive while undermining the country's economy and politics from within, Washington maximizes pressure while avoiding accountability. It is precisely this mixture of overt intimidation and covert destabilization that characterizes twenty-first century regime-change operations.
And there is a global angle. In July, I argued that the China-Venezuela partnership is a direct challenge to US hegemony. Beijing's infrastructure investments and energy agreements in Venezuela mean that any attempt to strangle Caracas is also an indirect attempt to contain China in the Americas. The re-entry of Chevron into Venezuela - sanction waivers notwithstanding - was another example of Washington's often contradictory approach. As I wrote at the time, Trump's Venezuela U-turn allowed US oil companies back into Caracas even while the rhetoric of neo-Monroeism grew louder.
Be as it may, the current naval operation must be understood as part of a broader geostrategic realignment. It signals that Washington is no longer willing to let Russia and China expand their presence in the so-called American sphere of influence. At the same time, it reveals the limits of American power: full-scale regime change in Venezuela would be costly and unpredictable. Maduro, despite relatively isolated, remains in power after years of sanctions, covert plots, and isolation. The Bolivarian state, with its militia system and alliances, is not Iraq 2003.
The risks, however, are obvious. Gunboat diplomacy can easily spiral into unintended conflict, especially if an incident occurs at sea. A blockade or "anti-narcotics" interception could escalate into skirmishes. Covert operations might backfire. And a crisis in Essequibo, on the Guyana border, could give Washington a pretext for deeper involvement.
In this light, Trump's Monroe Doctrine 2.0 looks both ambitious and brittle. It aims to restore hemispheric dominance, but it does so at a time when the US no longer enjoys unchallenged supremacy. China and Russia have gained footholds, and regional actors like Brazil are reluctant to play junior partners. Venezuela, despite its crisis, has proven more resilient than Washington anticipated.
To sum it up, the US naval buildup is about intimidation, not invasion - at least for now. But history teaches us that intimidation often precedes escalation. The coming months will reveal whether Trump is content with sabre-rattling or whether he is willing to take the far more dangerous step of military confrontation.