Lorenzo Maria Pacini
The U.S. is able to exert a profound influence on the internal political balance of other states without resorting to direct military intervention.
Non-intervention and manipulation of election results
The differences in how states describe the principle of non-intervention suggest that they may disagree on whether certain hybrid warfare activities, particularly cyber activities, constitute a violation. As usual, double standards apply: the U.S. claims to dictate the rules for the whole world, but in its own case there is always an exception.
Let us focus in particular on political interference or, using the terminology of international law and military law, on actions that influence a state's 'choice of political system'. Depending on how broadly states define this protected sphere of political choice, or how much 'coercion' they consider necessary to constitute illegal interference, some cyber operations may be considered legitimate by some states but illegal by others.
All states would probably agree that a cyber operation that manipulates election results, such as hacking electronic voting systems and altering vote counts, would violate the rule of non-intervention. Common sense and logic confirm this: tampering with elections is an act of interference.
Formally, even the United States explicitly identifies such conduct as an example of illegal intervention, and even considering the relatively strict standard of other countries (such as in Northern Europe) on coercion, which requires behavior that forces a state to make decisions it would not otherwise make, tampering with election results to change the winner meets this threshold, as it directly replaces an external choice with that of the state. Such behavior, carried out without consent, would also appear to "damage" the political system or "undermine" political stability as a whole.
Cyber intrusions that disrupt another state's government operations, such as hacking into government servers, would also be considered illegal intervention under most national interpretations. Examples include distributed denial-of-service attacks, which aim to block access to networks by overloading them with traffic. Although these actions often do not cause physical destruction and therefore may not reach the level of the use of force, they could still violate the principle of non-intervention.
Experts in the field believe that such activities would be illegal if they were aimed at imposing political change by paralyzing government functions; if they simply caused disruption without demanding political concessions, they might not constitute a violation. Conversely, according to interpretations adopted by other states, such operations would still be illegal. The United Kingdom and Australia explicitly mention interference with parliamentary activity as illegal intervention, and similar conclusions could be drawn from the approach of the United States and the broader standards applied by France, Iran, and China.
Let us recall a well-known news story: during the 2016 U.S. elections, newspapers reported that Russian actors had obtained and disclosed private emails belonging to John Podesta, Hillary Clinton's campaign chairman, an activity commonly described as doxing. Ido Kilovaty has defined this particular form of doxing for political purposes as 'Doxfare'. Although Russia's apparent goal, according to the media, was to spread damaging information about Clinton's campaign to the benefit of Donald Trump, other scenarios are conceivable. For example, a state could hack and disclose compromising material about senior officials in another country to pressure that state to change its policies.
According to the most common interpretation of the principle of non-intervention, such conduct would be illegal if evidence showed that it was intended to directly influence decisions that are the exclusive competence of the target state, such as diplomatic recognition. Even in the absence of a clear link to a specific political demand, the intimidating effect of such actions could still deprive a state of full control over its decision-making process, or otherwise 'damage', 'limit' or 'undermine' its sovereign authority. Consequently, according to the majority interpretation, politically motivated doxing would likely violate the rule of non-intervention.
For the U.S. and the UK, however, this is not exactly the case: doxing is considered a collateral activity as long as it originates from their government apparatus, as it is not necessarily aimed at tampering with the political outcome of elections and, therefore, is not automatically recognizable as 'intent to tamper'; when, on the other hand, they are the victims of this hybrid action, then recognition of intent becomes almost automatic and the enemy is immediately labeled as the attacker. Although the more ambiguous definitions of the United States and the United Kingdom make the conclusion less certain, it could reasonably be argued that influencing the choices of senior officials without their consent constitutes a form of coercive interference in matters central to state sovereignty.
Covert disinformation and overt propaganda campaigns
While less coercive in the strict sense, sophisticated and well-coordinated disinformation campaigns aimed at changing the behavior of another state may still violate the principle of non-intervention. In addition to cyberattacks and the dissemination of emails stolen during the 2016 election campaign, Russian "trolls" conducted a large-scale social media operation aimed at spreading and amplifying false and damaging news about Hillary Clinton. Some scholars have argued that this activity crossed the line between simple "propaganda" and outright coercive interference. The clandestine nature of these operations allegedly deprived the U.S. electorate of their freedom of choice, creating a situation in which it was not possible to properly evaluate the information received, thereby weakening and distorting the capacity for self-government.
However, given the high threshold required by the traditional concept of non-intervention, it would be difficult to prove that such campaigns are capable of "coercing" a state into a particular decision, for example by proving that they actually influenced the election outcome. In light of Iran's position that the massive and widespread sending of messages to voters constitutes unlawful intervention, disinformation campaigns would likely fall under the category of violations. Similarly, they could be considered as damaging or weakening electoral processes under the broader definitions adopted by France and China. A statement by former U.S. State Department legal adviser Brian Egan qualifies as unlawful any interference that impairs a state's ability to hold elections or manipulates the results; interpreting the notion of 'ability to hold elections' broadly, a coordinated disinformation campaign could therefore also violate the U.S. concept of non-interference. In contrast, the position of former British Attorney General Wright, which refers more explicitly to the alteration of election results, makes it more difficult to argue that such campaigns fall within the British notion of unlawful intervention.
The situation is different for overt propaganda campaigns, which are less likely to violate the principle of non-intervention, as there is an established practice of states seeking to disseminate information or opinions within other countries.
A historical example is Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, launched by the United States during the Cold War to broadcast news to the populations of communist regimes and still active in many areas of the world. Similarly, Russia Today and Sputnik, as well as China Daily and Xinhua, aim to present news in a favorable light for Russia and China, respectively. Numerous scholars have distinguished propaganda from coercive intervention, pointing out that, compared to covert disinformation campaigns, citizens can more consciously evaluate the source of information and it is difficult to argue that they are deprived of control over their own decisions. Consequently, open propaganda campaigns-even when they convey inaccurate or exaggerated information-are unlikely to violate the concepts of non-intervention adopted by the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia, as well as the particularly restrictive definition understood in Europe.
It is true that one could argue that propaganda 'damages' or 'weakens' a state's ability to make sovereign decisions; in particular, the Chinese notion of 'cyber sovereignty' implies total control of information flows within its territory. Similarly, it could be argued that any mass sending of messages to voters, regardless of their veracity, constitutes a violation according to the Iranian definition. However, beyond possible semantic interpretations, widespread state practice belies the idea that the customary principle of non-intervention makes such activities, as such, unlawful.
American exceptionalism
Doxing, however, is an activity that the U.S. knows very well and has established itself as an informal but effective practice and tool of contemporary geopolitical competition. It is a systemic and strategic action, far beyond the simple exposure of individuals. The U.S. has resorted to this practice mainly through selective leaks, declassified documents, intelligence reports filtered to the media, and judicial investigations with extensive international coverage. These actions aim to target the political, military, and economic elites of rival states, exposing their alleged illegal activities, corruption, human rights violations, or opaque links to criminal and terrorist networks. In this way, doxing becomes a tool of diplomatic pressure and information warfare.
A central aspect is the use of major Western media and digital platforms as multipliers of impact. The information, often coming from U.S. government sources or security agencies, is presented as independent investigative revelations, helping to construct narratives that delegitimize foreign governments. This can result in international isolation, economic sanctions, internal crises, or loss of political credibility.
It is an unconventional form of power projection, in which selective transparency and public exposure become geopolitical weapons. In an increasingly multipolar international system, state doxing therefore represents a new frontier of political, informational, and symbolic conflict, in which control of the narrative and management of information become central elements of competition between powers.
These doxing activities are structurally accompanied by practices of overt and covert propaganda. Overt propaganda manifests itself through official and declared instruments: public statements by political leaders, strategic documents, State Department reports, democracy promotion programs, funding for NGOs, and explicit media campaigns aimed at supporting certain values, institutional models, or geopolitical alliances. In this case, the goal is to shape international public opinion by presenting the U.S. vision as legitimate, universal, and morally superior. Covert propaganda, on the other hand, operates more discreetly and is difficult to trace. It includes indirect support for local media, influencers, think tanks, cultural and political actors who convey narratives favorable to U.S. interests without explicitly attributing the source. This category also includes information warfare operations, selective news framing campaigns, amplification of internal conflicts, and targeted dissemination of destabilizing content through digital platforms and social networks.
The interaction between propaganda and doxing is particularly significant: the publication of compromising information is often accompanied by a narrative construction that directs its interpretation, transforming data and revelations into tools of consensus or delegitimization. In this way, the U.S. is able to exert a profound influence on the internal political balance of other states without resorting to direct military intervention, consolidating a form of information hegemony that affects the sovereignty, decision-making autonomy, and international perception of the countries involved.