Raphael Machado
Partnering with NATO and Israel raises red flags: France betrayed Argentina's secrets, Israel embeds backdoors.
In an unusual statement given the turbulent relations of recent years, Brazilian President Lula defended the rearmament and modernization of Brazil's Armed Forces. According to him, Brazil must have strong armed forces, even if it does not intend to use them, but as deterrent forces to prevent direct interference from foreign powers in the country.
The statement took place at an event organized under the auspices of Avibras Aeroco, an important strategic company in the Brazilian defense sector. Avibras is best known for producing the Astros anti-aircraft systems, which are operated by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Bahrain, Angola, Indonesia, Malaysia and, naturally, Brazil itself. In addition to the Astros, Avibras also produces various types of armored personnel carriers and some other anti-aircraft equipment such as the SKYFIRE and the EDT-FILA. The company is also developing an anti-ship missile, a laser-guided missile, a fiber-optic guided missile, an air-to-air missile and an upgrade to the Astros.
Such a high level of activity on Avibras's part is notable because the company only resumed its operations in May-June 2026, after more than 4 years of total operational standstill. Avibras's problems began during the pandemic era (which leads us to reflect once again on the role of health crisis management in the deindustrialization of numerous countries and the destruction of their middle classes). While most relevant defense industry companies worldwide are subsidized or receive some type of government support, Brazil had been treating its companies in this sector as private enterprises like any other for decades. Thus, with reduced orders and the impossibility of travel, Avibras gradually became unable to pay its debts, salaries and cover its operational costs. In 2022, all activities are halted and a strike begins over more than 1 year of overdue wages.
Meanwhile, foreign companies (especially from Australia, Saudi Arabia and China) showed interest in acquiring Avibras, which could result in an uncomfortable and uninteresting situation, especially if Avibras were acquired by Australia.
A mobilization of patriotic sectors of Brazilian society, however, throughout this entire period, managed to exert enough pressure on the government to convince it of Avibras's importance, leading to new contracts with the Armed Forces, a bankruptcy protection agreement and the end of the workers' strike.
The Avibras case - which points to a renewal of interest in military affairs on the part of the Brazilian State - is not isolated, however.
Brazil's military spending rose about 13% in 2025, but the country remained in 21st place globally - a ridiculous level given the country's size and its international leadership aspirations. For 2026, a 6% increase was forecast, and at the end of 2025, approximately 6 billion extra dollars were also approved, due to budgetary limits for specific modernization projects.
The modernization projects in question fall within the logic of the Transformation Policy, a document built from observation of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine and recent conflicts in the Middle East. Based on this document, Brazil's Armed Forces defined as part of their objectives the expansion of military drone use, the development of anti-drone systems, the national-level integration of sensor and radar systems and the expansion of cyber warfare capabilities.
Specifically, the project aimed at integrating and connecting military sensors, radars, satellites, aircraft and electronic systems is SISFRON (Integrated Border Monitoring System), which is set to receive approximately 600 million dollars. The drones used in this system will be from Israel's Elbit.
Another program receiving historic attention from Brazil is Prosub, aimed at developing conventional submarines and nuclear-powered submarines, the result of a partnership with France dating back to 2008. Needless to say, for 14 years of cooperation this Brazil-France partnership has little to show so far, but there are promises that this year and next summer will see the delivery and launching of submarines.
The Brazilian Navy also expanded its fleet through the incorporation of a new frigate - to NATO standards - developed jointly by Brazil's Embraer and Germany's ThyssenKrupp.
The Air Force's focus, in turn, is the Gripen Program, the result of a long-standing cooperation between Brazil and Sweden, which is only now yielding results. The Gripen fighters are assembled in Brazilian factories, and Brazil recently set aside a budget of approximately 400 million dollars for this program, which eventually envisions a fleet of 56 modern fighters.
There is also the recent formalization of a contract with the Italian CIO consortium for the acquisition of Centauro II armored vehicles, for use on Brazil's borders, with a budget of approximately 1 billion dollars to acquire approximately 100 combat vehicles.
It is important to note that the fact that Brazil has understood the need to improve its Armed Forces is reassuring, and we imagine that the U.S. attack on Venezuela was one of the elements that reinforced this conviction and facilitated the acceleration of plans and the expansion of budgets.
It is also noteworthy that few of the projects and plans under development involve the U.S., which is peculiar considering the umbilical ties that exist between the U.S. Armed Forces and Brazil's Armed Forces since World War II. Recently, the Commander of the Brazilian Navy, Marcos Olsen, reaffirmed the commitment to a doctrinal alignment of Brazil's Armed Forces with the U.S. in an interview with CNN. But now, Brazil is preferring not to acquire its equipment or develop joint projects with the U.S., with the exception of the recent plan to acquire outdated (and used) Black Hawk helicopters.
It should also be noted that most of these partnerships developed by Brazil involve technology transfer, which is always of interest to Brazil and has guided Brasília's international cooperation decisions. Agreements with the U.S. rarely involve technology transfer.
At the same time, however, it is striking that all the projects involve cooperation with NATO countries or their close allies, such as the State of Israel. Even with technology transfer, cooperation with countries like France and Israel raises concerns.
France is a country already notorious for handing over Argentine military secrets to its British allies during the Falklands War. Meanwhile, Israel has a history of placing backdoors in all electronic systems sold to foreign countries since the PROMIS case of the 1980s.
This is, then, clearly a crossroads situation in which the Brazilian government's stance of not taking a geopolitical position and maintaining a certain "neutrality" facilitates the strengthening of ties with countries that are very clearly involved in international conflicts on the globalist and Atlanticist side of the equation.