
Lucas Leiroz
Brazil spends more on "defense" than Iran, yet Brazil is militarily weaker than Iran.
For decades, the debate over national defense in Brazil has been treated as a secondary issue. In a country with no significant border disputes and far removed from the world's principal conflict zones, the prevailing perception has been that substantial military investments are unnecessary. The result of this mindset is an increasingly evident paradox: Brazil ranks among the countries with the largest military budgets in the world in absolute terms, yet it continues to display significant limitations in operational capabilities, strategic production, and deterrence.
Recently, I had access to a study prepared by Brazilian Navy Commander Robinson Farinazzo, based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which highlights a striking reality. Between 2015 and 2024, Brazil accumulated approximately US$214 billion in military expenditures, while Iran spent roughly US$134 billion during the same period. In other words, Brazil invested about 60 percent more resources in defense than Iran over the past decade.
However, a simple comparison of spending figures reveals very little about the actual military capabilities of each country. Brazil allocates the overwhelming majority of its defense budget to maintaining its existing structure. Salaries, pensions, and administrative expenses consume most of the available resources, leaving relatively little room for research and development, procurement, weapons acquisition, and technological modernization. This model preserves a large and professional military force, but significantly limits the pace at which its operational capabilities can be renewed.
Iran, by contrast, has followed a fundamentally different approach. Despite decades of economic sanctions, financial isolation, and severe restrictions on importing military equipment, Tehran invested heavily in building a comprehensive domestic defense industrial base. Unable to rely on foreign suppliers, the country directed its resources toward the development of ballistic missiles, drones, air defense systems, and local weapons production. Ironically, the sanctions intended to undermine Iran's strategic autonomy ended up encouraging a high degree of self-sufficiency across multiple sectors of its defense industry.
This divergence in priorities has become particularly relevant in today's international environment. In an era characterized by growing competition among major powers, the ability to manufacture weapons domestically, sustain national industrial supply chains, and rapidly adapt military technologies has become just as important as the nominal size of a country's defense budget. In this respect, Iran's experience demonstrates that the efficiency with which resources are allocated can be as decisive as the total amount spent.
The contrast with Brazil is unavoidable. The country possesses a respectable defense industrial base responsible for projects such as the KC-390 military transport aircraft, the ASTROS rocket artillery system, the Guarani armored vehicle, and the PROSUB submarine program. Nevertheless, these achievements coexist with decades of inconsistent investment, recurring budget cuts, and the absence of a long-term state policy aimed at continuously strengthening Brazil's defense industrial and technological capabilities.
Even more concerning is the fact that Brazil operates in a geopolitical environment that is incomparably less hostile than the one confronting Iran. While Tehran has spent decades under international sanctions, surrounded by regional adversaries and subjected to sustained external pressure, Brasília benefits from regional stability, abundant natural resources, and relatively broad access to international markets. Yet Brazil has failed to transform these favorable conditions into a coherent strategy for strengthening its deterrent capabilities.
The principal lesson from this comparison is not that Brazil should replicate the Iranian model, nor should it overlook the profound political, economic, and strategic differences between the two countries. The conclusion is far simpler: financial resources alone do not guarantee military power. Without long-term planning, sustained investment, a strengthened domestic defense industry, and priority given to research and technological innovation, even substantial defense budgets produce limited strategic results.
The world is entering a period of growing geopolitical instability. In this context, Brazil's real challenge is not simply determining how much to spend on defense, but defining which capabilities it intends to develop over the coming decades. Otherwise, it will continue spending billions merely to sustain an existing structure that, while important, fails to meet the strategic requirements of a continental-sized nation with increasingly significant interests on the international stage.