By Patrick ARMSTRONG
To Moscow, Ukraine is not the problem, Washington is. Or, as Putin might put it: Tabaqui does what Shere Khan tells him to and there is no point in dealing with him, go straight to Shere Khan. That is what Moscow is trying to do with its treaty proposals.
For the same reason, Moscow is not much concerned with what the EU or NATO says; it assesses that they are Tabaquis too.
The current propaganda meme in Washington is that Russia is going to "invade Ukraine" and absorb it. It will not: Ukraine is a decaying, impoverished, de-industrialised, divided, corrupt and decaying mess; Moscow does not want to take responsibility for the package. Moscow is fully aware that while its troops will be welcomed in many parts of Ukraine they will not be in others. Indeed, in Moscow, they must be wishing that Stalin had returned Galicia to Poland rather than giving it to the Ukrainian SSR after the War and stuck Warsaw with the problem. This does not, however, rule out the eventual absorption of most of Novorossiya in ultimo.
The second delusion in Washington is that if Moscow did "invade Ukraine" it would start as far away from Kiev as possible and send tank after tank down a road so that the US-supplied PAWs could exact a heavy cost. That is absolutely not what Moscow would do as Scott Ritter explains. Moscow would use standoff weapons to obliterate Ukrainian troop positions, C3I assets, assembly areas, artillery positions, ammunition dumps, airfields, ports and the like. At its choice. It would all be over quite quickly and the Javelins would never be taken out of their boxes. But that is the extreme option as Ritter explains.
Unfortunately the Blinkens, Sullivans, Farkas', Nulands and others who seem to be driving USA policy don't understand any of this. They remain convinced that the US is a mighty power, that Russia is feeble and fading, that Putin's position is shaky, that sanctions are biting, that Russia's economy is weak and so on. And that they understand modern warfare. Everything in the past twenty years contradicts their view but they hold to it nonetheless.
Take, for example, Wendy Sherman who was the principal American negotiator in Geneva this month. Look at her biography on Wikipedia. Social worker, money raiser for Democratic Party candidates, political campaign manager, Fanny Mae, Clinton appointee to the State Department, negotiator with Iran and North Korea. Is there anything in that record to indicate any knowledge or understanding of Russia or modern war? (Or skill at negotiations for that matter?) And yet she's the one on point. Jake Sullivan: lawyer, debate preparer, political advisor, ditto.
Perhaps there's an American general officer who sees reality - certainly there are those who have spoken of Russia's formidable air defence or EW capabilities; others understand how weak NATO would be in a war on Russia's home field. But, as Colonel Lang points out, maybe not.
Overconfidence rooted on nothing is the problem. Moscow has made a proposal that is based on the undeniably true position that security is mutual. If one side threatens the other, then the threatened one will take steps to shore up its position and the threat level will rise and rise. During the Cold War both sides understood that there were limits, that threats were hazardous and that negotiating prevented worse things from happening. But Washington is lost in its delusion of everlasting superiority.
The so-called "Thucydides trap" is the name given to a condition when one power (Sparta then, USA now) fears the rising power of (Athens then, China and Russia today) and starts a war because it fears its position can only weaken. The brutal truth is that that point has already been passed: Russia+China are more powerful than the USA and its allies in every measurable matter - more steel, more food, more guns, more STEM, more bridges, more money - more everything. NATO/US would lose a conventional war - American military wargamers know this to be true.
In short, how can Moscow compel these people to see reality? This, in a word, is the problem: if they can see it, then something better is possible; if they can't, then it's the worse. For everybody's sake - Washington's too - Washington has to pay attention to Moscow's security concerns and dial down its aggressions. Moscow has asked - demanded really - and it's not yet clear that the attempt has failed. The negative reaction of the Tabaquis doesn't matter - Moscow only talked to them as a matter of form - it's Shere Khan's answer that matters. And we haven't had it yet.
Perhaps the aborted colour revolution in Kazakhstan was an answer from some portion of the US deep state/Borg but, if so, it was a swift and powerful demonstration of how poor an understanding of the true correlation of forces the US deep state has.
We await Washington's final answer but the prospects are not very encouraging at the moment: the cheap threats and bragging op-eds pour out. So what is Moscow's Plan B?
I have elsewhere listed some responses that I can imagine and others have done so too. I am thinking that Moscow has to do something pretty dramatic to shatter the complacency. I see three principal fronts.
- The United States has not been threatened with a conventional attack on its home territory since 1814; Russia has several ways that it can do so. The problem will be to reveal the threat in a way that cannot be denied or hidden. A demonstration of Poseidon's capabilities on some island somewhere followed by the announcement that a significant number are already deployed near US coastal cities?
- Washington must be presented with a demonstration of Russia's immense destructive military power that it cannot pretend away. Ukraine is the obvious field for such a demonstration. (See Ritter).
- A world-changing diplomatic move like a formal military alliance with China with a provision that an attack on one is an attack on both. This would be a demonstration of the correlation of forces that not even the most deluded could miss. Mackinder's Heartland plus population, plus manufacturing, plus STEM, plus resources, plus military and naval might joined in a military pact.
We shall see. The negotiations are not over and something better may come from them. Doctorow, a capable observer, gives some hope. But to get to a better result would require a pretty major change in attitude in Washington.
We can hope. The stakes are high.